

FREEZE:

15 Aug 82 (out from Wash, MX
lobbying, to SF)

Hyp: Concrete Freeze as a quickly-negotiated
moratorium — e.g. a warhead & flight-testing, and
deployment, of ballistic missiles

(compared to US moratorium on SL-r CMs):

WHILE NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS (+ demand Halt:

except for functional

maintenances, preserving

or enhancing stability:

(some C⁴; Trident I (C-4);

Midgerton).

LEAVE OUT "PRODUCTION"

FOR

TACTIC: "MORATORIUM" (STRIKE)

1985-86

- Original Freeze: 1) and its post-Reason Expe, willing to
implement

2) lines, not ready to specify details as if
Congress were negotiating;

3) Not ready to exploit opportunities to achieve
(at least parts of) Freeze through Congress, with Reason
(after Jan 12, 1982; or referendum, Nov 82 ...) (MX...)

4) Mistake? a) "Freeze," rather than halt, stop,
or "clipping at current levels
not instead of reductions" moratorium: further "no control" only in
form of reductions from current lines.

not "reductions first — i.e. increases now/first, while
waiting for agreement (on negotiations).
(Not, "reductions later" (which is impossible))

but "only reductions, no increases/additions, from now on"
(b) inclusion of Production. (+ CMs?)

(c) emphasis on negotiated stop (vs. unilateral
initiative; mutual halt (both, as in 1958-61: Wander; Werner)
or, immediate moratorium).

* Freeze approach rejects assumption that increases are
(or even, beneficial?) associated with
necessary to prospect of reductions; or that risks of US +
SU increases are outweighed by improved prospects (if any) of reductions

"REDUCE NOW/FIRST"

(i.e. negotiate reductions
now/first, while
increasing)

MEANS

"INCREASE FIRST/NOW"

Our response to new SU weapons need not be new US weapons, and must not be new CF/distrib. weapons. WE SHOULD REDUCE/ROEG TYPE II, even if SU pursues X.

FREEZE

15 July 83

freeze of distrib/CF - NFU (MHH)
/ weapons

Errors (cont.):

["We should stop, now; and seek mutual commitment to stop stopped, so long as the other side."] X

CF distrib.
- No new/more weapons, on either side.

- - Lack of focus on: What can/must be done under Reagan; before 1985⁸⁴⁻

- (Dim. - actual (potential) size of inventory, i.e. + US

-

- thresholds: - N-bank

- MX

- P/CM deployed

- SLCMs

- reserve force

- Central America

- (Poland, Afghanistan... ME?)

- non-nuc/RDF build-up.

- No proposals on Reductions: what, when (argued)...

from policy
view of Congress

- [To wit: no concession to "need to vote for some weapons system." (NO!)]

- Apparently, "absolutist / purist (NO-no more) / naive on SU ("") / unilateral (new-gun mountain)

- However, lack of focus on Congress

(education

lobbying... work.

grass-roots)

- - and on a) interim goals, efforts

b) What must be avoided, and why...

- X ○ - or on (c) specific indicate "partial Freeze" proposals: flight-test ^{CTB} _{ban}

- Focus on Cong. Resolutions (instead of budget devices)

- - Willingness to "accept"/submit votes for Freeze Res from reps. who intended to vote for de-stabilizing US initiatives: MX, D-5, P, CM (has been: C-4, N, reserve force... ^{Midnight;} _(45M!) 8-1?)

(A smaller vote for Freeze Res - linking it to those who would + did vote against MX - would have been less dramatic to Movement than a Freeze "victory" accompanied by MX "victory.")

- - lack of priorities on weapons to oppose (above); or rationale for doing so, "unilaterally."

Bille Cochran/Perry
FAS; anti-MX

Freeze:

address / what Freeze ignores: "What to do
under Reagan: 2) till '85
3) maybe after '85!
"How to get reductions; how to maintain Det..."

Further - You see as tactical errors of Freeze:

1) Refusal to accept power of USAF/MIC to
maintain a land-based ICBM force; "TRIAD" (cf. Don
Freeman!)
then, "and" to limit "replacement": perhaps
with new "stable" weapons (along with air control system)
(as MIM-II modes)

2) Refusal, for USAF/MIC (Congress, Estab) maintenance of land
force: then, B-1/Stratofort, ALCMs...

(3) Role of Koles in maintaining testing, "moderation", maintenance...

But they ignore:

1) Diffusion in Pres goals and priorities from this
(in fact, the existence of a coherent, Pres/Adm set of
goals) (TYPE II, not I-only; instability (Sovs, too - at least
+ D-L Adm as long as US does!))

2) In particular, desire for instability - given - SU challenge

3) Adm resistance to single-weapon missile
(as possible alternative to MX); insistence on at least
100 MX, and probable Adm (not just, Congress/USAF/MIC)
drive for 200-300, + D-5 and ABM.

(Scramcraft answer to
SU D-5?)

And, Adm uninterested in any deal with Sovs
(same on this appears as "victory") - even if election
does hang on it!

(Wickham, Rowland - who see INF agreement as
necessary + diff for reduction, have "bitch" - underestimate
Reagan resistance to easy agreement! because
they fail to see R strategy.)

4) Strength + persistence of anti-missile movement:
- the obstacle it posed to the approach
- and the opportunity it created for an alternative (the stopping
+ defeating Reagan approach (till '85) and perhaps its rejection.)

Then, "and" to
maintain
"modern"
Type I Det
(define requirements)
D-L? Type II...

Don see
R's effects on
instability as
careless
errors.

Why joined
Reagan as
smoking -
and asked
too little.

Jesse
Prosten

George
Somaripa

Randy
Kehler

Paul
Pickers

Bob
Fleischer

Jan
Orr-Harter

Kate Conway
(Detroit)

Dan
who?

Glenn
Stassen

Don
Slocum

Karin
Fierke

Carla
Johnston

happening:

20 July 83

- MX antd? ✓
- (FAST FOR LIFE; Aug 6 notes) ✓ Aug 27 demo ✓
- Freeze loss - Senate (debate?) (conditions?)
- R proposals: 4 Maneuvers: build-down?
- Sept? Midyear?

"flex."

INF?

- Congress on Central America

- MX approps

- P/CM END demos, CD (violence? police states?)

- Freeze loss on [P/CM? Immediate Freeze?

- P/CM deployment

- HAK Report on Central America.

- (Andropov dies?

Hands win?)

- SU responses to MX: SSX, LOW,

15

✓ - Even responses to P/CM.

"

"

X

- SU responses to P/CM:

- mess in East Europe

- S

- seeds off US?

X

- Cuba III?

a "Falklands"

- Central American War

- US/SU world war

- ME?

ABM?

"End of arms control"?

Accusations of SU "cheating" (ABM?)

[i.e. The environment of the arms race is about to change, as is the dynamics, the momentum/inertia

Frage

"Long-range goals" (after a Frage, & as it approaches)
do not include proposals for reduction!

- Goal: End (& reverse) the Arms Race: ^{avoid} addition
of any new weapons on either/both side (s). (Pres)
Avoid new US weapons either of 1) Frage (preferable)
or (2) rejecting funds (Congress, 2d best), with unconditionally
or conditionally on Pres' proposal (+ SC rejection) of a Frage,
or on (b) SC rejection.

- Thus, under Reagan, a negotiated Frage is not
a plausible "First Step": other public/Congressional
acts/actions are necessary: the period before a
Presidentially-proposed Frage is plausible. (above)

- The F. Campaign doesn't seem to have seen the
need for formulating and pushing pre-~~Frage~~ goals
and pressures under Reagan — perhaps it didn't
foresee moment would be so big by 1983 (1982) ~~that~~ ^{as to require}

esp. for 1983:
P, MX, CM
(ABR, 3 spec,
ASAT, CBW

+ see
Central America
(Falklands)

(also, Somerville's original emphasis on Cong. budget
action got lost — Why? ("Not prioritized." Why?
In 1982, campaign got sucked up into Resolution strategy
of Cong. initiatives).

Lack of these goals & role, thus, have led to
diminishment & marginalization: and to lack of influence
on critical decisions.

(Strat. Mktg agenda did not recognize need for
a new FF to address possible re-direction of
goals of next 6-12 months.

March 24, 83

Anti-Freeze

"moderation":

1. Increase: Trident? B-1? (MX?)

[Issue should be avoided if US whatever SU does - in next 5-10 years!]

[Opponents argue as if

- 1) SU had been offered a Freeze, + rejected it.
[i.e. "the only way to get reductions is to threaten a "buildup"]

- 2) SU would not be building new weapons
as are "caught up."

3) ... "aiming to negot" had not been tried for 20-38 years

- 3) our (joint) security will be higher at higher joint
level of arms - with more FS weapons on both sides.
- cut arms race is + will decrease risk of war...

- 4) SU had initiated most new developments, and
forced the peace, ignoring US offers

[see cont in Freeze: "abuse"] to say that
both sides were responsible.]

[SU's constitution has been to be "evil"; to
dominate tyrannical East Europe; to maintain large army;
and to watch US 'tech' dev, after a lag; finally, after
20 years, to build up to US new cap.
US cont. has been to, lead and force power of the
new arms dev, prod, + threats.

- (5) SU develops notably US's on proof of
intent of "world domination."

- (6) R proposed reductions were accompanied by additions of
new weapons, of the most dangerous sorts

(signing "strategy" as if START included a actual STOP on new FS weapons

- (7) ... it made no difference what kind of weapons + basis...

- A bilateral freeze, negot., is best.

but requires Pres to propose.

- An informal non-treaty is next best:

either side can initiate; Congress can enforce on US side.

- While or until negotiating, Congress can & must

avoid or postpone US developments that may stop such a

freeze maintainable by a Pres willing to propose it:

P, CM

(and less: MX*, B-1, weapon testing, D-5*

(* if deployed, increased FS instability).

- "Unwaring" in Time Nov (NYT March 19, 1983) that focus
will be more forthcoming when P is deployed, is about
simply wrong

[SC does not put highest priority on stopping or
reversing arms race:

Compared to: 1) "not having to back down in
confrontations again (like Taiwan Straits, Cuba II, Berlin,
Shipping, Egypt '73). + abandon allies

(2) Admitting to being #2 — by accepting unbalanced
arm agreements, or foregoing US tech. developments.

People who oppose Freeze as if:

as if: — What is in SU interest ("SU advantage")
could not be in US interest (i.e. no mutually
'advantageous' agreement is possible.

— ... strong relative true "advantage/superiority"
is still possible for either side.

(All that can be aspired to is increased — &
perhaps higher than opponent's — credibility of
triggering one war (not, prospects of fighting, limiting,
controlling, or winning one war).

This requires properly sized of lack of
control, of knowledge, or of rationality — reflected in
hardness ~~and~~ behavior and stature (+ personnel!)

It can work — like going into battle with a
battle of wits

You wouldn't want your daughter to make her
living that way —

or live in a neighborhood where that game was
being played.

Each side is watching the other in efforts to make
the opponent less secure.

JUNE 83

Resolution

form A

B

C

Effects

Why

Politics

More proposal 1982

Reo, with Denny, Aspin,
Pritchard, Hamilton

Congress is ~~about~~ is considering authorizing funds for
testing + producing a new missile

2000


The USG should not

Congress should not auth funds or testing without
~~trying to~~ exploring the possibility of a bilateral
halt to the testing — ~~how~~, the prod. + deployment — of
new missiles

No Pres has ever...

No Congress House has called on Pres to (i.e. X who
last has not forced him to do so ^{voted for MX})
nor done what it could to force confront
the issue with an opportunity...

Proposal: Call on the Soviet Government to cease the
— land-based and air-based —
flight-testing of all MIRVed ^{ICBMs}, Congress ^{must} ~~must~~
suspend all such ^{US} tests ^{for six months} ~~from~~ as of a certain date
^{say, Nov 3}
(^{several months} after passage of the bill), with extension
of this suspension (or, removal of testing) to be
~~starting~~



- We only have one President - and we only have
him for 4 years.

- Therefore, when our Pres gets into a disastrous corner, we don't
have another Pres to turn to - we only have Congress.

- Fortunately, we don't have both houses of Congress controlled
by the Pres' party.

- They just act that way, sometimes; but we can change
that.

- That leaves it to the House - or rather, it leaves it to us -
because if we leave it to the House, the House will
leave it to the White House.

- Don't let us of the recent vote on the MX, Congress
is participating in a program that escalates the arms race,
~~that~~ without the USG even having offered to halt the
arms race.

~~They should~~ Before participating in a decision to
launch a new cycle in the arms race, Congress should
assure that the SC has been offered a clear chance
to end the nuclear arms race.

This must be done without the close participation
leadership or full collaboration of the Executive Branch;

Therefore, those aspects of the Freeze that would require
mutual highly negotiation - e.g. verification requires
trading up on production and new deployments (e.g. GLCMs,
SLCMs) - ~~that~~ cannot be covered in a

legislative approach. But a mutual ^{halt to} ~~halt~~ on the flight-testing
of MIRVed ICBMs - preferably, both SCBMs + land-based missiles -
ballistic missiles

would stop "cooled" the next dogma structure
develops on both sides. [If SCBM's are inhibited, this would
point on Low Threat I (D-5): which, as the Scoutcraft
finds out, is the only prospective weapon that would ~~take~~
hold ~~over~~ open a "window of vulnerability" on both on
Land & ICBM forces, making both ^{potentially} subject to effective,
simultaneous attack. To repeat, no such attack is
possible today; ^{seems:} it will ^{not} become possible until the
Sovs can deliver a short-warning attack on our ICBMs,
which requires a high-accuracy, MIRV'd SCBM like on D-5.

A testing box would include this development (keeping last-board minutes visible as a deterrent to nuclear attack); so other means — none of those proposed in SACT II or in START — does so.

Of course, the ^{also} much ~~more~~ the US O-5 (though not the Trident I or C-4); but the disadvantages of the KJ ~~under the~~ though not widely appreciated — ~~have been~~ pointed out correctly by Sawyer, (and Rose, in 1982:').]

If this Pres will not propose a freeze, the Congress
^{should}
~~that~~ not ~~that~~ help him buy more & new weapons
programs that will prevent his successor from achieving
a halt to the arms race: programs whose number he
cannot ~~not~~ overcount, and which the Soviets will feel compelled
to counter and to imitate.

Above all, they must do ~~not~~ ^{not} land such progress without having done all they can to end this competition — without assuring that the Soviets have been confronted with the opportunity, the clear challenge and chance, to end this competition: A bilateral flight-test between M/RVed missiles would do this; ~~not~~ Congress has ~~not~~ done all it could to force the Pres to propose and explain — or to exp pose how the possibility directed to the Pres, the Cong. action — the possibility, and it should not rather for prevent new testing without having done one or the other.

What is needed is a House version of the Devin Amendment, calling for a mutual flight-test ban, but with teeth in it, not only a suggestion or sum of the House.

With the leadership & help of the House Dm leadership, legis. moves for overseeing other ends of jet will be found. Some rough possibilities:

1) A "freeze" on testing (or authorization of funding) until the President has proposed ...

and has reported that the Soviets have registered, or have continued testing

2) No testing unless after a certain date unless the House has a Pres. certifies that the Soviets have continued to test after that date.

History

3) Congress cuts off flight testing, after or with the funding & provisionally, for a 3 or 6 month period: to be reconsidered, for extension or for removal of testing ^{at} that time. It should be well clear, to the Soviets and to the US public, that Cong. ^{decision} reversal of testing will depend on SC behavior (only) with respect to flight-testing during that period.

This last (or all 3) could better be managed by the Executive Branch, if the Pres were willing to take the initiative of offering a halt and ("risking") ending the competition - CF esp. But since he is not, Congress should take the responsibility of attempting to do so. Unless Congress does what it can to ...

If Soviets do not want to halt, they will not respond - and the competition will continue (as it is now planned to do).

The House then is no majority (or even ~~strong~~ signif. minority) in the House for ~~an indefinitely~~ ^{unilateral} ~~proposed~~ halt that stops one-sided way long; nor is the public. But if ^{Soviets cannot test by themselves, for very long.} Soviets are willing to halt, ^{bilaterally} they cannot eliminate this until they are captured with US allies &

halt. Cuzuro can (~~It has to stop~~) ~~then~~ ~~the~~
but ~~know~~ or Pres to offer this, and may be able, if
necessary, to go beyond this to present the case with
a situation in which the ~~entire~~ responsibility for
continuing the CF now falls entirely on ~~the~~, challenging
the ~~with~~ to follow our lead in halting or to choose to
continue the two-sided competition (= which to or, &
will remain, at an economic and technological disadvantage,
despite the will & ability to match or capabilities over time).

Those who voted for the MX is a contingent that did not ~~include~~ test the low willingness to halt (the low down has prevented with no offer by either Carter or Reagan that did not include a proposed MX deployment of at least 100 ^{MX} ~~minutemen~~, plus D-5, along with civil minutes and new bunkers) can still, with logical consistency, act now to over a mutual halt ^{possibly} ~~possibly~~ ^{possibility}: protesting, to this end, the ^{contingent} ~~approval~~ of MX testing.

If the docs do negotiate with * a Pres offer
as a Congressionally-afforded moratorium - those who voted for the
- and for the offer of a mutual halt -
MX_A can even claim credit for viewing the chances for this
success, by strengthening the credibility of the implied threat
to organize this esp. if the docs refused a bilateral halt.
(Those who ^{would not vote for} ~~didn't want~~ the MX agency, no matter what
the docs did, should not begrudge the this credit, under
the circumstances).

If ^{Sans} ~~the~~ do not, nothing tangible has been lost — and
valuable info about the ^{three} nature of how progress will have been
gained.

If Pres were truly attracted by "Gore argument,"
he would not need to start prod. of MX to try it
on Gore — he could just change START proposals, as
Pres 61 proposed. (START proposals are with design
to achieve Gore's ends, if accepted by Gore; but to include
low counter-offers that would lead in the direction. That is
especially true if ≥ 100 MX are included as non-negotiable.

~~for Gore~~

- Who are we? Definition of our goals.
- "Our hands look weaker than our bite."
- Have we taken account of Cath bishops' statement?
- (Provance) We have made it too ~~easy~~ easy for people to support the Freeze...
- While worrying about votes in Senate, we are allowing funding questions to go by.
- Not hesitant to say that local groups will do "enough" without guidance from National
(esp. if they fear they will very be charged with hurting the Freeze.)
- Waller / Kabitaki: "Unilateral freeze" would lose the support of Senators and Pres Candidates.
Even, ~~assumed~~ Freeze app. to specific weapons would risk this.
[Our own after this support, or is our support of them in question?]
(Which needs which now?)
- BUT: "We in South, + Tex + Okla, must have a national movement dedicated to unilateral Freeze.
- Randy K: My heart lies with stronger stands -
but in interests of unity, if " " " don't
to split, I will support [unilateral, resolution approaches]

Frage Coalition:

- Can agree that a bilateral halt is better than the present bilateral arms race [Driven by ^{technological} unilateral US escalations and SU ~~escalated~~ responses (involving quantitative escalations in some dimensions:

i.e. to follow ^{technologically} - but may go beyond US numbers). (US is the one led to match in quantitative dimensions - with numbers of landers or vehicles, size or speed of warhead, throwweight, size of missiles, no. of subs ...)]

- but ranges from those who

2) oppose all weapons, one or over-one - "pacifist, unilateral disarmament"

- (6) ~~to~~ those who would support all new weapons proposed "on the merits" of Pros or Services or Tech, in the absence of a negotiated ^{binding} ~~unilateral~~ (ratified) treaty (some (many?) members of Congress.

(Though certain "arms control" rationales - building weapons to get ~~relative~~ reductions in others, or for stability (Mitigation), or to press SU, by this ^(MX) FS threat, its accords... are against the spirit of the Frage (?): highest priority, as means ~~address the issue~~ to US security, to ending the ^{one} arms race, comprehensively + definitively. Strong presumption against any new weapons.

(No weapon yet proposed (unless inaccurate SLOMs) remotely meets the heavy burden of proof here, or even a moderate one.

(But: explains or negotiates bilateral frage does imply the effectiveness of a threat to prevent the arms race otherwise.) (US: "independent, reciprocal, mutually-reinforcing initiatives" (Sato/ARSC)

Aspi might say: his approach is second-best, optimal given unattainability of frage under Reagan. (That still permits testing ban imposed by Congress.)

Across the line:

- someone who proposed the Testing
dual or probe or deployment of a particular new
weapon, to a bilateral halt — or even, to the
possibility (exploration) of one. (More).

- or someone who proposes open-ended arms race
to any successful arms agreement, or even to
negotiations and at agreement.

(CPD)

- or who proposes to keep Labs working, (CCNWP)

- or "production line open" ("to get reductions...
desi")

Shouldn't production have been left out? ("Verify")
and deployment? ^{or}
(Angus)
or postponed?

Neither was in store, in 1979-80-81 — for any of
new systems!

Idea of "bargaining chip," "stabilizer," "threat" — ^{or "match"}
test/build a new weapon "to reduce others — or, the type we call"
(MX/SS-18)
— has been shown to be an
effective rationale for continuing arms race.
Strong presumption against it.

(Last word: mitigation as upshot for MM-II.

Even Trident I can be upgraded by NAUSAT to FS weapon
(Garrin, Sicily)

Harvard study: "Living With a Nuclear Air Power."

"Living with Russia (limited) Russian Wars."

Threats of,

Traditional and control: political (domestic and international) and technical/strategic briefs for new weapons or operational developments; while averting an end to the arms race, or to one's own national role in driving it.

Managing, "stabilizing," and
monitoring or (occasionally ~~even~~ accelerating)
and race.

Rising risk, especially, ^{lower} higher than it
would be without our control measures "

- though actually, an entire process (with its political ^{payoffs} ~~side~~) may enlarge the overall arena, on both sides, creating new political support for reversing the ethnic-

(Ans control creates a desire for which it is a partial antidote — or sedation, analgesia...)

Human Version is a "right-wing Freeze" (to extent
~~&~~ it permits and perhaps even encourages building up to
 the point of a signed Treaty; in fact, the could be
stimulating to us now, esp to that point, which might
 not be needed! (see SALT-II! "Pinat" for CTB!
 via partial test ban), (SALT-I!)

Especially if no monotonicity at onset of negato
(or initial initiation, immediately!) — still more, if
this is ruled out (as Hansen Res suggests, though it
does not say so directly).